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Abstract. In a broadcast encryption system, a broadcaster can encrypt
a message to a group of authorized receivers S and each authorized
receiver can use his/her own private key to correctly decrypt the broad-
cast ciphertext, while the users outside S cannot. Identity-based broad-
cast encryption (IBBE) system is a variant of broadcast encryption sys-
tem where any string representing the user’s identity (e.g., email address)
can be used as his/her public key. IBBE has found many applications
in real life, such as pay-TV systems, distribution of copyrighted materi-
als, satellite radio communications. When employing an IBBE system,
it is very important to protect the message’s conﬁdentiality and the
users’ anonymity. However, existing IBBE systems cannot satisfy conﬁ-
dentiality and anonymity simultaneously. In this paper, using an anony-
mous identity-based encryption (IBE) primitive with robust property as
a building block, we propose a generic IBBE construction, which can
simultaneously ensure the conﬁdentiality and anonymity under chosen-
ciphertext attacks. Our generic IBBE construction has a desirable prop-
erty that the public parameters size, the private key size and the decryp-
tion cost are constant and independent of the number of receivers.
Keywords: Identity-based broadcast encryption · Anonymity · Robust-
ness · Chosen-ciphertext security · Random oracle model
1 Introduction
Broadcast encryption (BE), introduced by Fiat and Naor [16], is one kind of one-
to-many encryption that allows a broadcaster to encrypt one message to a group
of users who are listening to a broadcast channel, and only the authorized users
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can get the message. At present, BE causes a wide spread attention in theory
and practice. As BE can save most computational cost and communication load
relatively to repeatedly utilize point-to-point traditional encryption.
Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) [12,28] is a special kind of
public-key BE, in which the public key of each user can be any string just repre-
senting the user’s identity (e.g., email address) and the private keys of users are
generated by a private key generator (PKG) according to their identities. It is
the same as in the identity-based encryption [8]. There exists a desired property
is that IBBE can support exponentially many users as potential receivers.
While an encryption scheme aims to protect the message’s conﬁdential-
ity, another security requirement, namely, anonymity, which aims to hide the
receiver’s identity and it is a desirable security property in many application
scenarios. Anonymity comes from the key privacy concept, which was ﬁrst intro-
duced by Bellare et al. [6]. It captures the property that an eavesdropper cannot
tell which public key the ciphertext is created under. However, the receiver set
S in the traditional IBBE scheme is transmitted as a part of the ciphertext.
Obviously, it cannot hide the receivers’ identities. Therefore, traditional IBBE
schemes are unable to obtain the anonymity requirement.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a generic identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE)
scheme from a generic anonymous IBE construction, which is the ﬁrst IBBE
scheme simultaneously provide conﬁdentiality and anonymity against chosen-
ciphertext attacks under Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman (DBDH) assump-
tion. In addition, the public parameters size, the private key size and the decryp-
tion cost are constant and independent of the number of receivers is more eﬃcient
than the existing IBBE schemes.
1.2 Related Work
Since broadcast encryption (BE) was introduced by Fiat and Naor [16], many
BE schemes have been proposed, e.g., [9,12,13,17,28]. However, these schemes
cannot ensure the anonymity of receivers. To address this problem, in 2006,
Barth et al. [5] presented two anonymous BE constructions in the public key
setting with chosen-ciphertext security. Their ﬁrst construction is a generic BE
construction in the standard model, where the decryption cost is linear with the
number of receivers. As it need try to ﬁnd an appropriate ciphertext component
for decryption. Their second construction is an improved construction in which
only a constant number of cryptographic operations is required for decryption,
whereas the security proof relies on the random oracle model [7]. In PKC 2012,
Fazio et al. [15] proposed two outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption con-
structions with sub-linear ciphertexts, which are adaptive CPA and CCA secure
in the standard model, respectively. In the same year, Libert et al. [23] presented
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several anonymous broadcast encryption constructions with adaptive CCA secu-
rity in the standard model and gave an united security deﬁnition for anonymous
BE scheme. However, all of these constructions are in the public key setting.
In 2007, the ﬁrst IBBE scheme with ﬁx-size ciphertext and private key was
proposed by Delerablee [12]. Specially, their scheme supports a ﬂexible number
of possible users. That is, the number of users are not determined in the system
setup phase. Since then, lots of IBBE schemes with diﬀerent properties have been
proposed, e.g., [19,21,24,25,28,30,31,33,34,37,40]. When identity-based encryp-
tion is incorporated to the multi-receiver setting, many multi-receiver identity-
based encryption schemes [3,4,10] have been proposed. However, among all of
these IBBE and multi-receiver identity-based encryption schemes, the receivers’
identities are transmitted as a part of the ciphertext. Obviously, these schemes
cannot provide anonymity.
Therefore, many anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption schemes,
e.g., [20,26,38] and anonymous multi-receiver identity-based encryption schemes,
e.g., [11,14,22,29,35,36,39] have been successively proposed. However, none of
these schemes can achieve conﬁdentiality and anonymity simultaneously against
chosen-ciphertext attacks. In this paper, we have solved this problem.
1.3 Bilinear Groups
We brieﬂy review the concept of bilinear groups which is the underlying algebraic
structure of many IBBE including ours.
We assume there is a probabilistic algorithm G which takes as input a security
parameter λ and outputs a tuple (p,G,GT , e), where G and GT are multiplicative
cyclic groups of prime order p (of bit-length λ), and e : G × G → GT is a map,
which has the following properties: Bilinearity: e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab for all
u, v ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Zp. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1G, where g is a generator
of G. Computability: There exists an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for
∀u, v ∈ G.
1.4 Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Assumption
The decisional BDH (DBDH) problem in a bilinear group (p,G,GT , e) is
as follows: Given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) for a, b, c ←R Zp as input, out-
put 1 if Z = e(g, g)abc and 0 otherwise. For a probabilistic algorithm
A, we deﬁne its advantage in solving the DBDH problem as AdvDBDHA =
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] − Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, Z) = 1]|, where g is a ran-
dom generator in G and Z ←R GT . We say that the DBDH assumption holds if
all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms have a negligible advantage
in solving the DBDH problem.
2 Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
We shall review the deﬁnition and security notions for identity-based broadcast
encryption [18] as follows.
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An identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, associated with message
space M, consists of a tuple of four algorithms (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec):
Setup(1λ): On input of a security parameter λ, it outputs the public parameters
params and a master secret key msk.
Extract(msk, ID): On input of a master secret key msk and an identity ID, it
outputs a private key skID for the identity ID.
Enc(params, S,M): On input of the public parameters params, a receiver set
S and a message M ∈ M, it outputs a ciphertext CT .
Dec(skID, CT ): On input of a private key skID and a ciphertext CT , it outputs
either a message M or an error symbol ⊥.
The correctness property requires that, for all ID ∈ S, if (params, msk) ←
Setup (1λ), skID ← Extract (msk, ID) and CT ← Enc (params, S, M), then
Dec (skID, CT ) = M with overwhelming probability.
Remark. Identity-based encryption is a special case of identity-based broadcast
encryption, when the size of the receiver set is only one.
Next, we shall review the security notions for an IBBE scheme. First, we
review the model of indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-
CCA), which means that the ciphertext does not leak any information of the
message. Then, we review the model of anonymity under chosen-ciphertext
attacks (ANO-CCA), which means that the ciphertext does not leak any iden-
tity in the receiver set. Last, we review the model of weakly robust against
chosen-ciphertext attacks (WROB-CCA), which guarantees that the decryption
attempts to fail with high probability when the “wrong” private key is used.
Respectively, these security models are deﬁned by the following games between
a PPT adversary A and a challenger C.
The IND-CCA Game:
Setup: Challenger C runs (params, msk) ← Setup(1λ), and then sends the
public parameters params to adversary A and keeps the master secret key msk
itself.
Phase 1: Adversary A adaptively issues the following queries:
– Extraction Query: On input of an identity ID, challenger C returns skID ←
Extract(msk, ID) to adversary A.
– Decryption Query: On input of an identity ID and a ciphertext CT ,
challenger C returns m ←Dec(skID, CT ) to adversary A, where skID ←
Extract(msk, ID).
Challenge: Adversary A submits two distinct equal-length messages M0, M1
∈ M and a receiver set S∗ to challenger C. It is required that A has not issued
Extraction Query on ID ∈ S∗. Then challenger C ﬂips a random coin β ∈
{0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ ← Encrypt (params, S∗, Mβ)
to adversary A.
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Phase 2: Adversary A continues to adaptively issue queries as in Phase 1 subject
to the following restrictions: (i) A cannot issue Extraction Query on ID, where
ID ∈ S∗; (ii) A cannot issue Decryption Query on (ID,C∗), where ID ∈ S∗.
Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Deﬁnition 1. We define adversary A’s advantage in the IND-CCA Game as
AdvIND-CCAA,IBBE = |Pr[β′ = β] −1/2|. We say that an IBBE scheme is IND-CCA
secure, if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage AdvIND-CCAA,IBBE is negligible in
IND-CCA Game.
The ANO-CCA Game:
Setup: It is the same as in the IND-CCA Game.
Phase 1: It is the same as in the IND-CCA Game.
Challenge: Adversary A submits a message M∗ and two distinct sets S0, S1
to challenger C. It is required that |S0| = |S1| and adversary A has not issued
Extraction Query on ID ∈ S0S1, where S0S1 denotes S0∪S1−S0∩S1. Then
challenger C ﬂips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗←Encrypt(params, Sβ ,M∗) to A.
Phase 2: Adversary A continues to adaptively issue queries as in Phase 1 with
the restrictions as follows: (i) Adversary A cannot issue Extraction Query on
ID, where ID ∈ S0S1; (ii) Adversary A cannot issue Decryption Query on
(ID,C∗), where ID ∈ S0S1.
Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Deﬁnition 2. We define adversary A’s advantage in the above ANO-CCA Game
as AdvANO-CCAA,IBBE = |Pr[β′ = β]−1/2|. We say that an IBBE scheme is ANO-CCA
secure, if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage AdvANO-CCAA,IBBE is negligible in
the above ANO-CCA Game.
Remark. Note that the deﬁnition captures not only outsider attacks but also
insider attacks. In other words, even when an identity ID ∈ S0∩S1 is corrupted,
the anonymity of any non-corrupted ID ∈ S0S1 is still preserved.
The WROB-CCA Game:
Setup: It is the same as in the IND-CCA Game.
Query Phase: It is the same as Phase 1 in the IND-CCA Game.
Output: Adversary A outputs a message M , a receiver set S∗ = {ID1,
ID2, · · · , IDt}, where |S∗| = t. Challenger C outputs the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ ← Encrypt (params, S∗, M).
We say that A wins the WROB-CCA Game if Dec(skID∗ , CT ∗) = ⊥, where
ID∗ ∈ S∗ and skID∗ = Extract (msk, ID∗). It is required that A has not issued
Extraction Query on ID∗ in Query Phase.
We deﬁne adversary A’s advantage as the probability of that A wins.
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Deﬁnition 3. We say that an IBBE scheme is WROB-CCA secure, if for all
PPT adversaries A, the advantage of winning the above WROB-CCA Game is
negligible.
Remark. The above security notions of IND-CCA, ANO-CCA and WROB-
CCA can be naturally deﬁned for an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme by
limiting the size of the receiver set to be only one.
3 Generic Anonymous IBBE from IBE
In this section, we present a generic IBBE construction which builds on a IND-
CCA secure, ANO-CCA secure and WROB-CCA secure IBE primitive. The
generic IBBE construction has a desirable property that the public parameters
size, the private key size and the decryption cost are all constant and independent
of the number of receivers, while the ciphertext size is linear with the size of the
receivers.
3.1 Construction
Given an IND-CCA, ANO-CCA and WROB-CCA secure IBE scheme IBE=
(IBE.Setup, IBE.Extract,IBE.Enc,IBE.Dec) and a strong one-time signature
scheme Σ = (Gen,Sig,Ver), we construct an IND-CCA and ANO-CCA secure
IBBE construction IBBE = (IBBE.Setup, IBBE.Extract, IBBE. Enc, IBBE.Dec).
IBBE.Setup(1λ): On input of a security parameter λ, it generates a bilinear
map (p,G,GT , e), where G and GT are two cyclic groups with prime order p and e
is a bilinear map e : G×G → GT . Then, it chooses g←RG, α←RZp and computes
g1 = gα. Next, it runs 〈 ̂params, m̂sk〉 ←IBE.Setup(1λ). Besides, it chooses three
hash functions H1,H2,H3, such that H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : GT → {0, 1}λ and
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. The public parameters are params = (G, GT , Zp, e, p, g, g1,
̂params, H1, H2, H3) and the master secret key is msk = (α, m̂sk).
IBBE.Extract(msk, ID): On input of a master secret key msk and an identity
ID, it computes sk0ID = H1(ID)
α and sk1ID←IBE.Extract(m̂sk, ID). It outputs
the private key skID =(sk0ID, sk
1
ID) for the identity ID.
IBBE.Enc(params, S,M): On input of the public parameters params, a
receiver set S = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDt} and a message M , it ﬁrst generates a sig-
nature key pair (svk, ssk)← Gen (1λ). Then it chooses δ←RZp, lets r = H3(δ,M)
and computes the common part of the ciphertext T = gr. Next, for each ID ∈ S,
it computes c0ID = H2(e(g1,H1(ID))
r) and c1ID←IBE.Enc( ̂params, ID, svk ||
δ || M). Let C1 = (c0ID1 , c1ID1) || · · · || (c0IDt , c1IDt). The ciphertext is CT =
(svk, T , C1, σ), where σ = Sig (ssk, T || C1).
IBBE.Dec(skID, CT ): On input of a private key skID = (sk0ID, sk
1
ID) and a
ciphertext CT = (svk, T , C1, σ), where C1 = ( c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
) || · · · || (c0IDt , c1IDt).
It checks whether Ver(svk, T ||C1, σ) = 1 holds. If not, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it
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computes c0ID = H2(e(T, sk
0
ID)). If c
0
ID = c0IDj for all j ∈ {1, · · · , t}, returns ⊥;
else considers the smallest index j such that c0ID = c
0
IDj
, then computes L ←
IBE.Dec(sk1ID, c
1
IDj
). If L =⊥, returns ⊥; else parses L as svk′||δ′||M . If svk′ =
svk or T = gH3(δ′,M), returns ⊥; else returns M .
The correctness of IBBE construction follows directly from the correctness
and weak robustness of IBE scheme.
3.2 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze that the above IBBE construction is ANO-CCA
secure. Regarding the IND-CCA security, we have the following Theorem1,
whose proof can be found in the full paper.
Theorem 1. Suppose that H3 is a random oracle, the IBE scheme is IND-
CCA secure and the signature Σ scheme is a strong one-time signature, then
the generic IBBE construction in Sect. 3 is IND-CCA secure.
Next, we shall prove the following Theorem2, which states that our IBBE con-
struction is ANO-CCA secure.
Theorem 2. Suppose that H1,H2,H3 are random oracles, the IBE scheme are
WROB-CCA and ANO-CCA secure, the signature Σ scheme is a strong one-
time signature scheme and the DBDH assumption holds, then the above IBBE
construction is ANO-CCA secure.
Proof. We proceed by a sequence of hybrid games starting with Game0 where
adversary A is given an encryption of M∗ on S0. At the last game, adversary A
is given an encryption of M∗ on S1. Without loss of generality, we suppose S0
and S1 are diﬀerent by only one receiver and |S0| = |S1| = t. (The general case
can be proved through a hybrid argument, which is the adversary A selects the
receiver sets diﬀering by only one receiver each time.) Let IDv be the unique
element of S0\S1, IDw be the unique element of S1\S0. (Note that Si\Sj =
{ID|ID ∈ Si ∩ ID ∈ Sj})
Game0: The challenge ciphertext CT ∗ is a correctly encrypted M∗ on receiver
set S0, where CT ∗ = (svk∗, T ∗, C∗1 , σ
∗) and C∗1 = (c
0∗
ID1
, c1∗ID1) || · · · || (c0∗IDt ,
c1∗IDt). Let c = (c
0∗
IDv
, c1∗IDv ) = (H2(e(g1, H1(IDv))
r), IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDv,
svk∗ ||δ∗|| M∗)) be the challenge ciphertext component which is related to the
identity IDv.
Game1: It is the same as Game0, but the challenger rejects all post challenge
Decryption Query 〈ID,CT 〉, where CT contains the same veriﬁcation key svk∗.
Game2: c is replaced with (R, IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDv, svk∗ ||δ∗|| M∗)), where
R←R{0, 1}λ.
Game3: c is replaced with (R, IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDw, svk∗ ||δ∗|| M∗)).
Game4: c is replaced with (H2( e(g1, H1(IDw))r), IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDw, svk∗
||δ∗|| M∗)). Notice that the component is now encrypted on IDw instead of IDv.
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Game5: It is the same as Game4, but the challenger does not reject all post
challenge Decryption Query 〈ID, CT 〉, where CT contains the same veriﬁcation
key svk∗. Notice that the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ is correctly encrypted M∗
under the receiver set S1 now.
The above games diﬀer slightly from each other. In the following lemmas, we
shall show that every two adjacent games are computationally indistinguishable.
Transitivity shows that Game0 and Game5 are computationally indistinguish-
able. The challenge ciphertext CT ∗ in Game0 is encrypted M∗ on receiver set
S0 and the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ in Game5 is encrypted M∗ on receiver set
S1. According to the ANO-CCA Game, we can achieve that the above IBBE
construction is ANO-CCA secure.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the signature scheme Σ is a strong one-time signature
scheme, then Game0 and Game1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. We deﬁne event F that adversary A makes a legal Decryption Query
on (ID,CT = (svk, T, C1, σ)), where Ver(svk, T ||C1, σ) = 1 and svk = svk∗
and 〈(T ||C1), σ〉 = 〈(T ∗||C∗1 ), σ∗〉. Suppose event F happens, then it is easy to
construct a PPT algorithm C, which makes use of adversary A to break the
underlying one-time signature scheme Σ.
Setup: C is given a veriﬁcation key svk∗. Then C runs (params, msk) ←
IBBE.Setup(1λ). Next, it returns params to A and keeps msk itself.
Phase 1: A can adaptively issue Extraction Query and Decryption Query. C
can answer any Extraction Query and Decryption Query since it has the master
secret key msk.
Challenge: A submits a message M∗ and two distinct sets S0, S1 to C.
It is required that A has not issued Extraction Query on ID in Phase 1,
where ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}. C ﬁrst runs IBBE.Enc(params, S0, M∗) to obtain
a part of ciphertext 〈T ∗, C∗1 〉, and then obtains (from its signing oracle) a
signature σ∗ on the “message”〈T ∗||C∗1 〉. Finally, C sends challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ = (svk∗, T ∗, C∗1 , σ
∗) to A.
Phase 2: A continues to adaptively issue queries as follows:
– Extraction Query: A issues Extraction Query on ID, such that ID ∈ {IDv,
IDw}, C handles them as in Phase 1.
– Decryption Query: A issues Decryption Query on 〈ID,CT 〉, C parses CT as
(svk, σ, T , C1), if Ver (svk, T ||C1, σ) = 1, svk = svk∗ and 〈(T ||C1), σ〉 =
〈(T ∗||C∗1 ), σ∗〉, then C presents 〈(T ||C1), σ〉 as a forgery and aborts. Other-
wise, C answers these queries with the master secret key msk as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Observe that Game0 and Game1 are identical as long as event F does not
happen. If event F happens with a non-negligible probability, then C can forge
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a valid signature with a non-negligible advantage. However, since the signature
scheme Σ is a strong one-time signature scheme, then event F happens with
negligible probability.
Hence, Game0 and Game1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 2. Suppose that DBDH assumption holds, then Game1 and Game2 are
computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can distinguish Game1 from
Game2. It is easy to construct a PPT algorithm C that makes use of A to solve
the DBDH problem. Suppose C is given a DBDH challenge (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) with
unknown a, b, c ∈ Zp, C’s goal is to output 1 if Z = e(g, g)abc and 0 otherwise. C
acts as a challenger with adversary A as follows.
Setup: C runs ( ̂params, m̂sk)←IBE.Setup(1λ), sets g1 = ga, and chooses H1,
H2, H3 as random oracles. C gives the public parameters params = ( ̂params,
g, g1, H1, H2, H3) to A and keeps m̂sk itself.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries as follows:
Hash1 Query: On input of an identity ID, C does as follows: if there exists
a record 〈ID,Q, q,〉 in the H1-list, which the list is initially empty, returns
Q; else chooses  ←R {0, 1} and q ←R Zp. If  = 0, computes Q = gq; else
computes Q = gbq and adds 〈ID,Q, q,〉 into the H1-list. C returns Q to A.
Hash2 Query: On input of X, C does the following: if there exists a record 〈X, v〉
in the H2-list, which the list is initially empty, returns v; else selects v ←R Zp,
and adds 〈X, v〉 into the H2-list. C returns v to A.
Hash3 Query: On input of (δ,M), C does the following: if there exists a record
〈δ,M, r, gr〉 in the H3-list, which the list is initially empty, returns r; else selects
r ←R Zp, adds 〈δ,M, r, gr〉 into the H3-list. Returns r to adversary A.
Extraction Query: On input of an identity ID, C ﬁrst issues Hash1 Query on
the identity ID and gets the tuple 〈ID,Q, q,〉. If  = 1, C outputs ⊥ and
aborts; else C computes sk0ID = gq1. Then runs IBE.Extract(m̂sk, ID) to obtain
sk1ID. C returns skID = (sk0ID, sk1ID) to adversary A.
Decryption Query: On input of 〈ID,CT 〉, C parses CT as (svk, σ, T, C1), where
C1 = (c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
)|| · · · ||(c0IDt , c1IDt). If Ver(svk, T ||C1, σ) = 0, C outputs ⊥;
else C issues Hash1 Query on ID to obtain the tuple 〈ID,Q, q,〉. When
 = 0, C computes sk0ID = gq1, and then uses sk0ID and the master secret
key m̂sk to respond this Decryption Query. When  = 1, C computes
sk1ID ← IBE.Extract(m̂sk, ID), computes L =IBE.Dec(sk1ID, c1IDj ) in turn for
j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}. If L is ⊥, continues to the next j until L as svk′||δ′||M ′. Then
checks if svk = svk′, if not, output ⊥; else queries Hash3 Query on (δ′,M ′) to
gets (δ′,M ′, r′, gr
′
), and then checks if T = gr
′
, if not, outputs ⊥; else returns M ′.
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Challenge: Adversary A submits a message M∗ and two distinct sets S0, S1
to C. It is required that A has not issued Extraction Query on ID in Phase 1,
where ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}. C ﬁrst runs (svk∗, ssk∗)←Gen(1λ) and sets T ∗ = gc.
Then, C issues Hash1 Query on IDv to obtain the tuple 〈IDv, Qv, qv,v〉.
If v = 0, C outputs ⊥ and aborts; else C computes X∗v = Zqv . C issues
Hash1 Query on all IDj , where IDj ∈ S0/IDv, to obtain the corresponding
tuple 〈IDj , Qj , qj ,j〉. If there exists some j = 1, outputs ⊥ and aborts;
else computes X∗j = e(g
a, gc)qj . Meanwhile, for all IDj ∈ S0, C queries Hash2
Query on X∗j to obtain c
0∗
IDj
, where c0∗IDj = H2(X
∗
j ). Next, C chooses a ran-
dom δ∗ and runs c1∗IDj ←IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDj , svk∗||δ∗||M∗) for IDj ∈ S0. Let
C∗1 = (c
0∗
ID1
, c1∗ID1)|| · · · ||(c0∗IDt , c1∗IDt). Last, C runs σ∗ ←Sig(ssk∗, T ∗||C∗1 ) and
returns CT ∗ = (svk∗, T ∗, C∗1 , σ
∗) to adversary A.
Phase 2: A continues to adaptively issue queries as follows:
Extraction Query: Adversary A issues Extraction Query on ID, where ID ∈
{IDv, IDw}, C handles them as in Phase 1.
Decryption Query: Adversary A issues Decryption Query on 〈ID,CT 〉. C parses
CT = (svk, T, C1, σ), where C1 = (c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
)|| · · · ||(c0IDt , c1IDt). If svk = svk∗
or Ver(svk, T ||C1, σ) = 0, C outputs ⊥. Otherwise, C does as follows:
– When CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}, C outputs ⊥;
– When CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ S0 ∩ S1, C outputs M∗;
– When (CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ S0 ∪ S1) or (CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}),
C answers as in Phase 1;
– When CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}, C computes sk1ID ← IBE.Extract
(m̂sk, ID). If there does not exist j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}, such that c1IDj = c1∗IDv ,
C answers as in Phase 1; Otherwise, if there exists some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t},
such that c1IDj = c
1∗
IDv
, where c1∗IDv ← IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDv, svk∗ ||δ∗|| M∗).
When ID = IDv, C outputs ⊥, as the corresponding message is svk∗||δ∗||M∗,
as svk = svk∗ has been rejected. When ID = IDw, C answers as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
It is easy to observe that, if Z = e(g, g)abc, then C has properly simulated
Game1. If Z is uniform and independent in GT then C has properly simulated
Game2. Therefore, if A can distinguish Game1 and Game2 with a non-negligible
advantage, then C also has a non-negligible advantage to resolve the DBDH
problem. However, the DBDH assumption is hard to resolve. Hence, Game1 and
Game2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the IBE scheme are ANO-CCA secure and WROB-
CCA secure, then Game2 and Game3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can distinguish Game2 from
Game3, it is easy to construct a PPT algorithm C who makes use of A to break
the IBE scheme’s ANO-CCA security or the IBE scheme’s WROB-CCA security.
C acts as a challenger and plays with adversary A as follows.
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Setup: C ﬁrst receives the master public key ̂params from the IBE challenger.
Then C picks generator g ∈R G, α ∈R Zp, computes g1 = gα and chooses hash
functions H1, H2, H3. Next, C gives public parameters params = ( ̂params, g, g1,
H1, H2, H3) to A and keeps α itself.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries as follows:
– Extraction Query: On input of an identity ID, C ﬁrst issues Extraction Query
on ID to the IBE challenger to obtain sk1ID, and then C computes sk0ID =
H1(ID)α. Finally, C returns skID = ( sk0ID, sk1ID) to adversary A.
– Decryption Query: On input of 〈ID, CT 〉, C ﬁrst parses CT as (svk, σ, T ,
C1), where C1 = (c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
) || · · · ||( c0IDt , c1IDt). If Ver(svk, T ||C1, σ) = 0,C outputs ⊥; else C computes sk0ID = H1(ID)α and c0ID = H2( e(T , sk0ID)).
If there is no c0IDj = c
0
ID for j ∈ {1, · · · , t}, C returns ⊥; else C considers the
smallest index j such that c0IDj = c
0
ID, and then C issues Decryption Query
on (ID, c1ID) to the IBE challenger and obtains a result L. If L =⊥, C outputs
⊥; else parses L as svk′||δ′||M ′, checks if svk = svk′, if not, outputs ⊥; else
issues Hash3 Query on (δ′,M ′) and obtains (δ′,M ′, r′, gr
′
), checks whether
T = gr
′
holds, if not, outputs ⊥; else returns M ′.
Challenge: A submits a message M∗ and two distinct sets S0, S1 to C. It
is required that A has not issued Extraction Query on ID ∈ {IDv, IDw} in
Phase 1. First, C picks δ∗←RZp, computes r = H3(δ∗,M∗) and sets T ∗ = gr.
Second, C runs (svk∗, ssk∗)←Gen(1λ), sets m∗ = svk∗||δ∗||M∗ and sends m∗
and (IDv, IDw) to the IBE challenger and receives a ciphertext c1∗IDβ←IBE.Enc
( ̂params, IDβ , m∗) from IBE challenger. Third, C chooses a random R ∈ {0, 1}λ
and sets c0∗IDβ = R. For IDj ∈ S0 ∩ S1, C computes c0IDj = H2(e(g1,H1(IDj))r)
and c1IDj ←IBE.Enc( ̂params, IDj , svk∗||δ∗||M∗). Let C∗1 be the concatenation
of (c0IDj , c
1
IDj
) for all IDj ∈ Sβ . Fianlly, C runs σ∗ ← Sig(ssk∗, T ∗||C∗1 ) and
returns the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = (svk∗, T ∗, C∗1 , σ
∗) to adversary A.
Phase 2: A continues to adaptively issue queries as follows:
Extraction Query: A issues Extraction Query on ID, where ID ∈ {IDv, IDw},
C handles them as in Phase 1.
Decryption Query: A issues Decryption Query on 〈ID, CT 〉, C parses CT as
(svk, σ, T , C1), where C1 = (c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
)|| · · · ||( c0IDt , c1IDt). If svk = svk∗ or
Ver(svk, T ||C1, σ) = 0, then C outputs ⊥. Otherwise, C does as follows:
– When CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}, C outputs ⊥;
– When CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ S0 ∩ S1, C outputs M∗;
– When (CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ S0 ∪ S1) or (CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}),
C answers as in Phase 1;
– When CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}, C ﬁrst computes sk0ID = H1(ID)α
and c0ID = H2(e(T, sk
0
ID)). For each j ∈ {1, · · · , t}, if c0IDj = c0ID, C returns
⊥; else C considers the smallest index j such that c0IDj = c0ID. If c1ID = c1∗IDβ ,
C outputs ⊥. Since c1∗IDβ← IBE.Enc(IDβ , svk∗||δ∗||M∗), when ID = IDβ ,
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IBE.Dec(skIDβ , c
1∗
IDβ
) and the corresponding message is svk∗||δ∗||M∗, as
svk = svk∗ has been rejected; When ID ∈ {IDv, IDw}/{IDβ}. As the IBE
scheme is WROB-CCA secure, then IBE.Dec(skID, c1∗IDβ ) =⊥ with negligi-
ble probability. Otherwise, C issues Decryption Query on (ID, c1ID) to IBE
challenger as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
If the IBE challenger encrypts svk∗||δ∗||M∗ under IDv, then C is simulating
Game2; else the IBE challenger encrypts svk∗||δ∗||M∗ under IDw, that is C is
simulating Game3. Therefore, if adversary A can distinguish Game2 from Game3
with a non-negligible advantage, then C also have a non-negligible advantage
to break the ANO-CCA security or WROB-CCA security of the IBE scheme.
However, the IBE scheme is ANO-CCA secure and WROB-CCA secure. Hence,
Game2 and Game3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 4. Suppose that DBDH assumption holds, then Game3 and Game4 are
computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. The case for distinguishing Game3 from Game4 is symmetric with the
case for distinguishing Game1 from Game2.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the signature scheme Σ is a strong one-time signature
scheme, then Game4 and Game5 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. The case for distinguishing Game4 from Game5 is symmetric with the
case for distinguishing Game0 from Game1.
4 Comparisons
In this section, we compare the security and performance among the existing
anonymous IBBE schemes and our concrete instantiation from our generic IBBE
construction which is presented in AppendixA. The results of comparisons are
presented in Table 1.
In Table 1, it shows that the constructions [14,29] and the ﬁrst construction
[39] have some security ﬂaws in their security proofs. As constructions [11,29]
both pointed out construction [14] does not achieve anonymity. Constructions
[22,35] both pointed out construction [29] does not achieve anonymity. Con-
struction [36] gave an insider attack about anonymity for the ﬁrst scheme of
[39]. Construction [11] and the second construction [39] do not have security
proofs. Construction [32] is only an outsider-anonymous IBBE with adaptive
CPA security in standard model. Constructions [20,26,38] are all CPA, while
our construction can simultaneously ensure the conﬁdentiality and anonymity
under chosen-ciphertext attacks. In particular, our scheme is not less eﬃcient
than these existing IBBE schemes, although all of them cannot obtain the same
security as ours. Thus, the comparison results indicate that our concrete IBBE
scheme has a better overall security and performance. The symbol “×” means
there exists some security ﬂaws or problems in their security proofs and “−”
means there is no security proof in the scheme.
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Table 1. Security and Performance Comparisons
[14] [11] [29] [39]-1 [39]-2 [20] [26] [38] [32] Ours
Confidentiality CCA - CCA CCA - CPA CPA CPA CPA CCA
Outsider Anonymity × - CCA CCA - CPA CPA CPA CPA CCA
Insider Anonymity × - × × - CPA CPA CPA − CCA
Security Model ROM - ROM ROM - ROM STD STD STD ROM
Pk Size O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(n) O() O() O(1)
Sk Size O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(k) O(k) O(1)
CT Size O(k) O(k) O(k) O(k) O(k) O(k) O(k) O(1) O(1) O(k)
Decryption time O(1) O(k) O(1) O(k) O(k) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1)
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a generic IBBE scheme from a generic anonymous
IBE construction. The generic IBBE scheme obtains the conﬁdentiality and
anonymity against chosen-ciphertext attacks simultaneously. In addition, the
scheme has a desirable property, that is the public parameters size, the private
key size and the decryption cost are constant and independent of the number
of receivers. However, our construction is proved in the random oracle model.
So our future work is to construct a generic anonymous IBBE construction with
chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
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A A Concrete Instantiation
We shall present a concrete instantiation based on the generic IBBE construc-
tion, employing Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [8], which is IND-CCA secure and
ANO-CCA secure as noticed in [1] and WROB-CCA secure as noticed in [2]
and a concrete signature scheme, e.g. [27] which is a strong one-time signature
scheme Σ = (Gen,Sig,Ver).
Setup(1λ): On input of a security parameter λ, it ﬁrst chooses a bilinear group
G,GT of prime order p with bilinear map e : G × G → GT and a generator
g←RG, and then picks α, β←RZp, computes g1 = gα and g2 = gβ , chooses hash
functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → Zp, H3 : GT → {0, 1},
H4 : {0, 1} → {0, 1}(λ++n), H5 : {0, 1} × {0, 1}λ++n → Zp which
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are modeled as random oracles. The public parameters are params =
(G,GT ,Zp, p, e, g, g1, g2,H1,H2,H3, H4, H5) and the master secret key is msk
= (α, β).
Extract(msk, ID): On input of the master secret key msk and an identity
ID, it computes sk0ID = H1(ID)
α and sk1ID = H1(ID)
β . The private key is
skID = (sk0ID, sk
1
ID).
Enc(params, S,M): On input of the public parameters params, a receiver
set S = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDt} and a message M ∈ {0, 1}n, it ﬁrst runs
(svk, ssk) ← Gen(1λ), chooses δ1, δ2 ←R {0, 1}, lets r1 = H2(δ1||M) and
r2 = H5(δ2||svk||δ1 ||M), and then computes T1 = gr1 and T2 = gr2 .
For each ID ∈ S, it computes c0ID = H3(e(g1,H1(ID))r1) and c1ID =
(c10ID, c
11
ID) = (H3(e(g2,H1(ID))
r) ⊕ δ2,H4(δ2) ⊕ (svk||δ1 ||M)). Let C1 =
(c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
)|| · · · ||(c0IDt , c1IDt). The ciphertext is CT = (svk, T1, T2, C1, σ), where
σ =Sig(ssk, T1||T2||C1).
Dec(skID, CT ): On input of a private key skID and a ciphertext CT , it parses
CT as (svk, σ, T, C1), where C1 = (c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
)|| · · · ||(c0IDt , c1IDt). If Ver(svk,
T1||T2||C1, σ)=0, returns ⊥; else computes c0ID=H3 (e(T1, sk0ID)) and determines
which ciphertext should be decrypted among (c0ID1 , c
1
ID1
)|| · · · ||(c0IDt , c1IDt). For
each IDj ∈ S, if c0ID = c0IDj , returns ⊥; else chooses the smallest index j such
that c0ID = c
0
IDj
and c1ID = c
1
IDj
. It computes δ′2 = H3(e(T2, sk
1
ID)) ⊕ c10ID,
svk||δ1||M = H4(δ′2)⊕ c11ID. If T1 = gH2(δ1||M) or T2 = gH5(δ2||svk||δ1||M), returns
⊥; else returns M .
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